by Andrew Flake
Parties fighting over the meaning of an arbitration clause often begin with the question of who interprets the clause, making decisions on validity and scope: Is it a trial court, or is it the arbitrator? Most arbitral institutions answer this question in their applicable rules of procedure, and in the case of AAA, its Commercial Rules provide that the arbitrator “shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim, without any need to refer such matters first to a court.”
When an otherwise enforceable clause designates those Rules as applicable, the Eleventh Circuit, like the other circuits that have considered the issue, views it as “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the parties agreed for the arbitrator to decide. It so held in its U.S. Nutraceuticals, LLC v. Cyanotech Corp. case in 2014.
Although the Georgia Court of Appeals noted that principle in a 2019 opinion, Web Iv, LLC v. Samples Constr., LLC, the observation was dicta and the basis for compelling arbitration a different one: that the issue in Web Iv — whether one of the parties had complied with a pre-dispute requirement of business negotiation and mediation — was a “procedural question” growing out of the dispute, a class of questions traditionally handled by the arbitrator.
But earlier this month, in The River Club Cmty. Ass’n v. Escalante River Club, LLC, the Georgia Court of Appeals very clearly and for the first time held that by incorporating AAA Rules, the parties clearly assign to the arbitrator the decision on her jurisdiction:
We find the language of Rule 7(a) to be plain and unambiguous in its meaning that the arbitrator shall have the power to rule on the arbitrability of any claim. And we thus hold, as an apparent matter of first impression and as have the vast majority of federal courts to consider the issue, that the parties’ incorporation of Rule 7(a) into the Agreement constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that they intended for an arbitrator, and not a court, to resolve the issue of arbitrability.
Although the Court does not discuss its 2024 opinion in Milliken v. C. Merrill Constr., which rejected a similar argument under an older version of AAA’s Construction Industry Arbitration Rules (those in effect prior to March 2024), it did cite to Milliken for a standard of review, thereby recognizing it, suggesting that the Court at least considered the difference. That difference, if there is one, would have to be that the current Commercial Rule 7(a) has broader language, delegating to the arbitrator not only questions of jurisdiction but of “the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim, without any need to refer such matters first to a court.”
Writing for the full panel, Judge Padgett also notes that, where those Rules apply, the “procedural” versus “substantive” arbitrability framework is not necessary; even a “substantive” question, like whether one party’s conduct waived the ability to pursue arbitration, would fall under Rule 7(a).
One hopes that the adoption here of a clear and easily administered rule, at least for the most common forms of arbitration clauses in agreements between commercial parties, will save parties time and fees in pre-dispute skirmishes. It addresses only where they will make their jurisdictional arguments in cases governed by AAA Rules, and not whether a given clause covers the parties’ dispute. The latter will depend upon the particular clause and the particular dispute, argued by the parties to the arbitrator they’ve selected. ABF
[The cases cited are U.S. Nutraceuticals, LLC v. Cyanotech Corp. , 769 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2014); The River Club Cmty. Ass’n v. Escalante River Club, LLC, A26A0907 (Ga. App. Oct 02, 2026) (Padgett, J.); Milliken v. C. Merrill Constr. 902 S.E.2d 669 (Ga. App. 2024); Web Iv, LLC v. Samples Constr., LLC, 824 S.E.2d 107, 349 Ga.App. 607 (Ga. App. 2019).]